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Thursday, February 14, 2013

HORN-WATCH: Somalia: International Donors Cut Aid and Inflate ...

HORN-WATCH: Somalia: International Donors Cut Aid and Inflate ...: By Dr. Michael A. Weinstein,


A closed source, who cannot be further identified, confirms the judgment that the "donor"-powers/U.N. are in the process of scaling back their financial commitment to "Somalia," and reports that the power distribution among the major Somali domestic political actors has altered in response to the "donor"-powers' tilt toward the Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) and away from Somaliland and Puntland, with the latter most adversely affected.

According to the source, funding for the programs and projects in "Somalia" is being initially cut by twenty-five percent . At the same time, relocation of agencies to Mogadishu is eating into the remaining funds, and the S.F.G. is "demanding" from the "donor"-powers a greater share of the shrinking aid pie, and getting it. The S.F.G.'s bigger slice is at the expense of N.G.O.s, especially Somali agencies and civil-society organizations.

Amidst their financial drawback, the source reports, the "donor"-powers are engaged in a fierce competition for influence with the S.F.G., which is why they are meeting its "demand." Turkey, which has committed itself foursquare to the S.F.G., has goaded the European Union and the Western "donor"-powers into a competition for the S.F.G.'s favor. Great Britain is leading the charge, having been handed the lead "donor"-power role in Somalia by the United States.

The tilt towards the S.F.G. has gone so far, says the source, that ninety-eight percent of security funding and ninety percent of governance funding are going to it. At the same time, says the source, the S.F.G. remains weak, not even in control of districts in Mogadishu, much less the areas beyond the capital.

The present weakness of the S.F.G., coupled with the largesse being heaped upon it and the increasing probability that it will be further rewarded by the "donor"-powers moving to have the United Nations arms embargo against it lifted, has stimulated opposition to the tilt and to the S.F.G. by domestic actors that feel they have been shortchanged and left out. According to the source, Puntland, the nascent Jubbaland state, and the Haber Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye, which resists dominance in the S.F.G. by the Hawiye-Abgal, have attempted to reverse the tilt without success. Somaliland also stands to lose, but the source reports that the "donor"-powers are reluctant to abandon it at present.

Looking ahead, the source says that Somaliland and Puntland will receive their normal funding through 2013, but that 2014 is a question mark, given that the "donor"-powers plan at that time to make the World Bank the lead funding agency for "Somalia." According to the source, the World Bank has held meetings with Somaliland and the S.F.G., and with no other entities our authorities.

The source expects the World Bank to put the S.F.G. on a performance test to determine the level of funding it deserves. Somaliland and Puntland have until 2014 to show that they deserve their own funding. Regional states (Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya) , the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia (AMISOM), and the regional cooperation organization (I.G.A.D.) will be kept in place and continue to receive funds.

Analysis

A description of the structured political dynamics in which the international and domestic (Somali) actors function can be drawn from the source's report.

At the center of the picture is the S.F.G., which is characterized simultaneously by a deficit of political power and a surfeit of international ("donor"-power) favor. It has been the beneficiary of competition between Turkey and the E.U. countries for influence over the S.F.G., now that they have created it as something they can fight over by giving it legitimacy.

The problem (for the "donor"-powers ) of their inflation of the S.F.G. is that the S.F.G. is politically weak on the ground, so weak that it will need substantial support from the "donor"-powers to gain de facto control over its de jure territory. Yet the "donor"-powers are cutting their aid to "Somalia" substantially. That the S.F.G. will govern even south-central Somalia is unlikely. Yet it will be expected by the "donor"-powers to "deliver." The S.F.G. is getting enough pie to make other domestic actors envious and resentful, but not enough pie to hand out to potential opponents and prevail on the ground.

It is unclear whether lifting the U.N. arms embargo against the S.F.G. would strengthen the latter sufficiently to change the picture of political weakness coupled with international favor. The S.F.G.'s domestic opponents believe that it would change the distribution of power to their disadvantage. On February 6, the British Telegraph newspaper reported that the U.S. is pushing the U.N. Security Council to lift the embargo. The Telegraph's diplomatic source says that the move would be done to give a "political lift" rather than a military advantage to the S.F.G. by signaling that it is considered to be a sovereign government rather than a trusteeship entity. The revocation of the embargo would, says the diplomatic source, involve easing imports of weapons while maintaining "a strict monitoring mechanism." The U.S. is reportedly being resisted by Great Britain and France, because the latter fear that arms might get into the hands of factions loyal to (ex-) warlords. As it stands, the S.F.G. is an empty shell with a glittering fa├žade and, as the source put it, all the other actors are being drawn "into its orbit."

The underside of the highly unstable condition of a weak actor being favored externally is the mobilization of opposition to the S.F.G. taking on a clan-conflict cast. Characterizing the S.F.G. as a government dominated by Hawiye-Abgal, the opposition unites on a clan basis against the perceived threat of clannist domination. If that is the political dynamic into which the Somali political actors are entering, its final moment is civil war. One must ask whether or not the "donor"-powers have factored the possibility of civil war into the calculations that lead them to favor the S.F.G. How much clan-based opposition to the S.F.G. will there be in south-central Somalia? How will the authorities and quasi-authorities through shouth-central Somalia react to the perceived Hawiye-Abgal dominance? How can clan-based conflict be averted?

The above is not to say that the civil-war scenario has a high probability of eventuating, but that its possibility has emerged. In the short term, the factions in the south-central regions need time to organize authorities and sort out local disputes before they are ready to challenge overtly the S.F.G. Somaliland is likely to harden its independence stand, especially with the "donor"-powers seeming to be willing to deal with it directly; and Puntland, which is hurt the most by "donor"-power favor towards the S.F.G., will be forced to reassess its strategies and options. Puntland's president, Abdirahman Farole, is witnessing one of his negative scenarios coming true: the re-emergence of Mogadishu as a "city-state" dominating Somalia. The S.F.G.'s inflation threatens to alienate Puntland from the "Somalia" project.

Puntland is the other actor, beside the S.F.G., that deserves closer consideration; it has been left on the other side of the tilt. Puntland's grand strategy from its inception has been to gain the benefits of association with a Somali central government ("donor"-power access, legal standing) and the substance of self-rule by declaring autonomy until a satisfactory form of political rule was instituted in south-central Somalia. At that time it would enter a weak federation in which its previous autonomy was in all significant respects preserved.

That strategy now appears to be failing as Puntland undergoes a period of political change to a multi-party democracy. What will be Puntland's next move? Will it opt for independence? Will it join forces with the variegated opposition to the S.F.G. in south-central Somalia? Will it knuckle under and be folded into the S.F.G.? Somaliland has avoided the day of reckoning temporarily. Puntland is there. Its leverage, more than ever, depends on the political form that the southern region takes, whether it follows Puntland or the more centralized form being forwarded by the S.F.G. A separate source reports that the S.F.G. is backing the ex-warlord Barre Hirale against the factions trying to form the Jubbaland state, with Puntland supporting those factions. It is a proxy conflict opening up within Somalia, initiated by Somali actors. One can expect more such confrontations, particularly if clan rivalry becomes the basis for conflict among Somali factions.

Conclusion

The underlying dynamics of the "donor"-power tilt toward the S.F.G. has been to inflate the S.F.G. without having given it the power to back that up, and to deflate Puntland. This new balance creates an unstable situation in which the S.F.G. would be tempted to cross what, for Puntland, would be a red line. The two are already competing through proxies in the south. The point of an overt split and open hostility between the two has not yet been reached.

Meanwhile, the more the opposition to the S.F.G. takes on a clan-conflict cast, the more difficult it will be to resolve disputes, such as bringing Puntland and the S.F.G. into accord.

A third source, on the ground in south-central Somalia, says that the "donor"-powers prefer to deal with a small close group of Somali officials, if for nothing else than convenience and expediency. If that is the case, then one can understand why they do not take the power positions of Somali actors into their calculations, particularly the consequences of a redistribution of power.

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu

Saturday, June 2, 2012

International Aid Money Disappeared, Diverted Or Squandered In Somalia: Report

By Jacey Fortin: Subscribe to Jacey's RSS feed
June 1, 2012 1:05 PM EDT

A new report from the World Bank reveals a pattern of aid mismanagement in Somalia. In 2009 and 2010, about $130 million in funds delivered to the transitional government seem to have disappeared into thin air.
According to the Voice of America, the report accused the government, which is backed by the United Nations, of vastly under-reporting its revenues. It suffers from a lack of transparency, having no established accounting system and no disclosure of financial statements.

For the poverty-stricken population of Somalia, the mismanagement of sorely-needed international aid is a serious affront that must be addressed immediately. 

Somalia's former finance chief, Abdirizak Fartaag, explained to VOA that many donations go straight to officials rather than to the country's central bank.

"What we did observe is that in relationship to the bilateral funds, donations often are given directly to individual government members and do not exactly specify exactly who and how," he said. "But such donations appear to have happened. But we did find and did make observations that this money is not fully deposited in the central bank; sometimes it's only partly."

The World Bank report was circulated in Istanbul at a two-day conference on Somalia. On Thursday and Friday, hundreds of Somali politicians and international dignitaries met there to discuss the future of the East African country as it works to install a permanent government over the next three months.

By August 20, Somali officials hope that a newly-elected government will lead a unified Somalia away from its tumultuous past.

But if this transition is to be successful, it must be ensured that international aid money achieves its intended purpose. Speaking in Istanbul on Friday, United Kingdom Foreign Minister William Hague told the BBC that an oversight committee in Somalia was long overdue.

"The details of this need to be finalized with the government of Somalia -- and frankly I was hoping it could be done by now, by this conference in Istanbul -- if it is not signed here... then it needs to signed in the next few weeks," he said.

The challenges facing Somalia have persisted for decades; it has been a failed state since 1991, when dictatorial president Siad Barre was overthrown by warring factions that subsequently failed to unite the country. Since then, the country of nearly 10 million people has been burdened with famine, drought, conflict, piracy, Islamist militants and widespread poverty.
In the south, the terrorist group Al Shabab has pursued a campaign of violence over the past several years. In the North, which is comparatively stable, a high degree of autonomy has prompted talks of secession. Along the eastern coast, pirates make a living committing theft and kidnapping. And in the capital city of Mogadishu, African Union troops from Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti address security concerns that the transitional government cannot handle on its own.

In addition, the entire Horn of Africa region was devastated by a famine in 2010 and 2011 that killed tens of thousands of people.

During a London conference in February, representatives from 55 countries and international organizations worked to establish a unified international plan to address Somalia's endemic problems. Millions of dollars in aid were promised, and the number of African Union troops in Somalia was boosted from about 12,000 to more 17,000 in order to ramp up the efforts to flush Al Shabab militants from the country.
But now that the efficacy of international aid has been called into question, attendants of the conference in Istanbul are looking for ways to address discrepancies before more funds disappear.

Part of the problem is a lack of comprehensive data on the country. In March, the World Bank reported that there are some signs of progress there, including modest GDP growth of 2 to 3 percent over the past decade. But even that figure may be skewed since it reflects a country-wide average and does not take into account stark divisions within the country. Northern areas of Somalia, including Somaliland and Puntland, are significantly more stable than central and southern areas of the country. Those northern regions have operated with a high level of de facto autonomy for years.

Somalia's apparent economic growth could be attributed to northern progress or to niche markets, not necessarily reflecting the reality in areas where poverty is most pronounced.

"Whatever growth has happened has not translated into much development," explained the March report. "Poverty remains rampant:  43 percent and 73 percent of the population live below $1 and $2 per day, respectively.  In GDP per capita terms, Somalia is close to the bottom of African nations. On two critical outcomes for health -- (child mortality of 180 deaths per 1000 births) and education (average primary school enrollment at 22 percent) -- it performs dismally. This is in spite of massive external inflows of cash in the form of remittances, [official development assistance] and military assistance."

This week's World Bank report has made it clear why this cash has not made yet made its intended impact. Going forward, domestic politicians and officials abroad will be tasked to keep a closer eye on aid efforts in Somalia, and the establishment of an oversight institution will be one more responsibility for Somali politicians as they cobble together their first permanent government in over 20 years.  

To report problems or to leave feedback about this article, e-mail: j.fortin@ibtimes.com
To contact the editor, e-mail: editor@ibtimes.com


Ex-Somali official asks Va. court for immunity


7:53 PM, May. 16, 2012
RICHMOND — A lawyer for the former prime minister of Somalia told a federal appeals court Wednesday that a judge improperly acquiesced to the State Department's view that his client can be sued over alleged war crimes.

Mohamed Ali Samantar is appealing U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema's ruling that he is not entitled to immunity from a lawsuit filed in 2004 by several Somalis who claimed they suffered brutal repression, including torture and mass killings, under the regime of dictator Siad Barre. Samantar has denied any wrongdoing.


Samantar was a top official in dictator Barre's regime, serving throughout the 1980s as vice president, defense minister and prime minister. He left Somalia after the regime's collapse in 1991 and eventually settled in Fairfax County.

Samantar attorney Joseph Peter Drennan told a three-judge panel of the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that the issue of civil immunity for a former official of a foreign state is one for the judiciary, not the executive branch. He said Brinkema simply accepted the State Department's determination without conducting any legal analysis.

"The government deigned to state what the common law ought to be in this country," Drennan said. "That is not the call of the executive, it is the call of the judicial department."

He acknowledged that the executive branch has a foreign relations interest in such matters, but said the State Department failed to explain how granting Samantar immunity could embarrass the U.S. or implicate its foreign policy.

Plaintiffs' attorney James Tysse argued that the State Department's determination is entitled to significant deference — and that's what it got from Brinkema.

He also said the foreign policy concern is clear: "The United States condemns human rights abuses and has a strong interest in protecting human rights."

Tysse said that if former foreign leaders are awarded civil immunity, the U.S. could become a safe haven for those responsible for atrocities.

Samantar has been trying to assert immunity for years. He succeeded at first, with Brinkema ruling in 2007 that he enjoyed the protection as a former official of a foreign state. But the ruling was overturned on appeal, and the case wound up back in Brinkema's court after it was reinstated by the U.S. Supreme Court.

In February, citing his failing health and mounting legal costs, Samantar agreed to accept legal liability for the alleged war crimes although he continued to maintain his innocence. Brinkema has not yet entered a default judgment, however, and Samantar is continuing to pursue the immunity claim.

Tysse told the appeals court the immunity argument will be moot as soon as the judge decides the amount of damages and records the judgment, but Drennan disagreed. He said Samantar cannot default in a proceeding he should not have been subjected to in the first place.

The appeals court typically takes several weeks to rule.

Thursday, July 7, 2011

Veils come off in Somali - Paradise for Women

By Eva Krafczyk Jul 7, 2011, 2:06 GMT

Hargeisa, Somalia - Fatimah Ibrahim has dedicated herself to women's rights in her Somali homeland. The head of a non-governmental organization in Hargeisa, capital of the breakaway republic of Somaliland, she champions better educational opportunities for girls and women and improvements in their legal status.

But not only that.

'Women also have the right to look good and be pampered a little, don't they?' Ibrahim asks with a mischievous smile.

The women's rights activist has become a businesswoman on the side by opening a beauty salon.

'Janno Dumar' ('Paradise for Women') is written on the wall enclosing the salon grounds, which are totally off limits to men. All of the employees and customers are women. This is the only way the small spa-like enclave can hold its own in the Muslim country, where foreign women must also wear a veil and headscarf in public.

Somalia does not immediately suggest itself as a spa destination. While Somaliland is by and large peaceful, Ibrahim's salon would be shut down immediately and accused of being Westernized and un-Islamic in south-west Somalia, where radical Islamic groups control the countryside. In Somaliland, too, the lives of many women are anything but intact.

'There's domestic violence but it's not reported to the police,' Ibrahim says. 'And if a married woman goes to the police after being raped, she's seen as an adulteress, not a victim, and hauled before court.'

Once the women are by themselves in the salon, the veils come off. They sip tea and coffee, nibble on sweets and giggle.

Leila, 25, flops into a comfortable, upholstered chair with her legs apart. She would never dare to sit that way in a cafe in the presence of her father or one of her brothers. But she remains wary even behind the walls of the 'Paradise for Women,' declining to give her last name or allow herself to be photographed.

'It's a good thing there's a place like this for us women,' Leila says after leafing through several fashion magazines. Although she could never wear the clothes pictured on their pages on the streets of Hargeisa, she enjoys imagining how she would look in them.

'The men have their cafes and rounds of khat,' she notes, referring to a popular narcotic plant whose leaves are chewed. 'Usually all that women can do is to get together with girlfriends in private homes. Here we've got our little domain.'

Leila's girlfriend Hamida, soon to be a bride, is shown clothes in the salon's showroom for her big day. She wants as much glitter, ruffles and candy colours as possible. Some of the necklines are quite revealing and would likely be seen only by the female wedding guests and groom.

Hamida needs to book her beauty treatment in time, too, because the wedding would be preceded by many hours of massaging, plucking, hairdressing, putting on makeup and, of course, applying henna dye.

'One has to plan on an entire day at least,' asserts Emem, a make-up artist.

Malika does not have that much time to spare. She allows herself two hours of relaxation, though, and has her hands, feet and forearms painted with intricate henna patterns. The scent of incense hangs in the air. Malika lays on a chair, eyes half-closed, while the make-up artist applies a thick paste of henna from a tube and places a fan closer for faster drying.

'No, I'm not going to a wedding or a party,' Malika says. 'Today I'm simply indulging myself. I've got enough obligations to my husband and family.'

EU Commissioner Andris Piebalgs announces more support for stability and regional cooperation

06/07/2011

The FINANCIAL -- Brussels, 06 July 2011 - During a visit to Somaliland, the EU Commissioner for Development, Andris Piebalgs, announced today that the European Union is considering to provide around additional €175 million in EU support to Somalia, including to Somaliland.

In his speech before the Somaliland Parliament, Mr Piebalgs said: “The European Union welcomes the contribution that Somaliland is making to peace and good governance in the region. It is an encouraging example of peace, democracy and stability. This is why we will invest additional development funds as security and the socio-political conditions favour sustainable development.”

Additional EU support in Somaliland will focus on areas to foster economic development, education and governance.

During his visit, Commissioner Piebalgs met President Silanyo and delivered a speech to the House of Representatives in Hargeisa. Commissioner Piebalgs underlined that Somaliland is an example of stability and democracy which will hopefully encourage others to promote broader political dialogue, development and integration. He stressed that Somaliland has a role to play in economic integration and development in the Horn of Africa region.

Mr Piebalgs encouraged Somaliland to stay engaged in international efforts to curb piracy, and commended the efforts of the Somaliland coastguard, police and judiciary.

The EU Development Commissioner discussed the political, social and economic situation of Somaliland during a meeting with members of civil society and the business community. He commended the constructive role played by the Somaliland Diaspora and reiterated the importance of the European Union’s engagement with Non-State Actors - including civil society and the private sector - in its development efforts.

Commissioner Piebalgs concluded his visit to Somaliland with a tour of Berbera Port and a livestock quarantine facility, where he also met the principal and students of the EU-supported Sheikh Technical Veterinary School.

Somaliland: EU Commissioner Andris Piebalgs announces more support for stability and regional cooperation

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Update in Yousuf v. Samantar: Court Orders Questioning of Former Somali Defense Minister for Abuses

July 1st, 2011
Somaliland Human Rights Victim
On July 1, 2011, Magistrate Judge John F. Anderson ruled that Samantar must sit for a deposition and face three days of questioning from the plaintiffs.  General Samantar had asked the Court to postpone indefinitely the deposition, claiming that because of his alleged ill health, he should not be forced to answer questions about the human rights abuses that he ordered in Somaliland in the 1980s.  

The Court rejected his claim, however, ruling that unless he comes forward with specific evidence that requires cancellation of the deposition, then he will be forced to answer Plaintiffs' questions, beginning on July 19, 2011.

The court also authorized the plaintiffs to take depositions of third-party witnesses in Ethiopia.  Samantar had argued that Ethiopia would be a hostile location for the witnesses.  But the Court disagreed, concluding that Ethiopia is a viable locale. 

CJA and pro-bono co-counsel Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld anticipate taking witness depositions in Ethiopia in August.

These rulings mean that the case against General Samantar is on track to go to trial before the end of the year.

Monday, July 4, 2011

Somalia: U.S. took fighters’ bodies after op

By Malkhadir M. Muhumed - The Associated Press
Posted : Friday Jul 1, 2011 11:09:33 EDT
NAIROBI, Kenya — U.S. military forces landed in Somalia to retrieve the bodies of dead or wounded militants after a U.S. drone strike targeted a group of insurgents, Somalia's defense minister said Friday.
The operation is at least the second time U.S. troops have landed in Somalia after a targeted strike, though no forces have been stationed there since shortly after the "Black Hawk Down" battle that left 18 Americans dead in 1993.
Defense Minister Abdulhakim Mohamoud Haji Faqi called on the U.S. to carry out more airstrikes against the al-Qaida-linked militants, though he admitted that Somali officials appear not to have been informed about the June 23 operation near the southern coastal town of Kismayo beforehand.

"But we are not complaining about that. Absolutely not. We welcome it," Faqi said. "We understand the U.S.'s need to quickly act on its intelligence on the ground. We urge the U.S. to continue its strikes against al-Shabab because if it keeps those strikes up, it will be easier for us to defeat al-Shabab."

U.S. officials have increased their warnings that the threat from Somalia's al-Shabab militant group is growing and that militants are developing stronger ties with the Yemen-based al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.
Incoming Pentagon chief Leon Panetta told lawmakers last month that as the core al-Qaida leadership in Pakistan undergoes leadership changes, with the killing of Osama bin Laden, the U.S. needs to make sure that the group does not relocate to Somalia.

In 2009, U.S. helicopters swooped over a convoy carrying the al-Qaida fugitive Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, who was killed in the U.S. raid. Elite commandos rappelled to the ground and collected two bodies.
Faqi said the June 23 attack was carried out by a U.S. drone, and that after the attack U.S. forces picked up militants who were either killed or injured. Residents in Kismayo reported hearing helicopters hovering overhead the night of the operation.

"We have intelligence reports from our own sources that the U.S. Army picked up militants after the strike," Faqi said, declining to disclose them. He said that the Somalia government would release the militants' names when they're confirmed by DNA tests.

In late 2009 the U.S. deployed drone aircraft to the island nation of Seychelles. A U.S. official said then that the drones were primarily for anti-piracy efforts but that he couldn't rule out their use over Somalia.
Rashid Abdi, a Somali expert with the International Crisis Group, said if the drone strikes are conducted with "sensitivity" they would cripple al-Shabab without causing a public outcry over civilian deaths.

"Any increased foreign military involvement carries its own risks. However, short, sharp and surgical strikes to take out foreign jihadists or degrade al-Shabab may not be a bad thing," he said. "Due care must be taken to avoid civilian deaths."

The approximately 9,000 African Union forces in Somalia — led by troops from Uganda and Burundi — have gained ground in an offensive this year against al-Shabab fighters.

The Pentagon is sending nearly $45 million in military equipment to those two nations to help their troops in Mogadishu. The aid includes four small, shoulder-launched Raven drones, body armor, night-vision gear, communications and heavy construction equipment, generators and surveillance systems.

Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda, spokesman for the AU peacekeepers, welcomed the U.S. assistance, saying it will help the force increase its surveillance abilities. "With the help of drones, we can locate insurgents in real time and deal with them decisively," he said.

He also urged the U.S. to increase its strikes against militants to destroy insurgents' command and control capabilities. "If you eliminate al-Shabab leadership, you are limiting their power to conduct successful military operations," Ankunda said.

Even as the U.S. says it will increase its focus on al-Qaida and its affiliates, Faqi said al-Shabab fighters make an easier target than militants in Pakistan or Yemen, because Somalia has few mountainous areas that can serve as hideouts. He said he didn't believe militants in Somalia are as experienced as in other parts of the world.
Still, U.S. officials have said they believe that al-Shabab counts hundreds of foreign fighters — including veterans of the Iraq and Pakistan-Afghanistan conflicts — among its ranks. A Somali soldier last month killed Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, a top al-Qaida operative and the mastermind behind the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Somalia hasn't had a functioning government since 1991, a state of chaos that has allowed militancy and piracy to flourish. Faqi said the U.S. pays the bulk of the army’s salary, along with Italy, and that his government gets logistical and capacity building supports from America. He said his government is grateful but needs even more help with hospitals, communication equipment and vehicles.

Faqi said al-Shabab is in a "very, very difficult situation nowadays, financially, militarily and morally," and that any sustained aerial strikes would further weaken the militants, who control large swaths of the country's southern and central regions, including portions of the capital, Mogadishu, despite the success of the African Union offensive.

"There is mistrust among its top leaders, and between Somalis and foreigners. So I believe that new aerial strikes against its leaders will be another nail in the coffin of al-Shabab," he said.

Cusbitaalka Guud ee Hargeysa oo Falal Tuugo ah oo Bukaan Jiifka lagu Xadaa ka dhex Dilaaceen iyo Adeegyadiisa Caafimaad oo laga dayriyay.


Monday, July 4th, 2011 
 

Cusbitaalka Guud ee Caasimada Hargeysa ayay ka dhex dilaacday tuugo fool xun oo lagu xado Bukaan socodka halkaasi dabiibk Caafimaad ugu jira.


Tuugadan oo ay sababtay baylah dhinaca waardiyayaasha  Cusbitaalka ah, ayaa la sheegay inay fuliyaan Tuug isugu jira rag iyo Haween qaarkood Cusbitaalkasi caafimaad ugu jiraan, kuwaasoo dadka Bukaan jiifka ah ka qaata Lacagt iyo waxyaabaha kale ee muhiimka ah sida Bustayaasha iyo dharka cusub ee loo keeno.

Falalkan Tuugada ah ee Cusbitaalka Hargeysa ka dhex dilaacday oo Wargeyska Waaheen  ay u xaqiijiyeen qaar ka mid ah Hawl wadeenada Cusbitaalka, Waardiyayaasha habeenkii ilaaliya meheradaha cisbitaalka u dhaw   iyo dad  si joogto ah  ugu xidhan Cusbitaalka oo ka cudur daartay in Maagacooda la shaaciyo, waxa la sheegay in ilaa toban qof oo dumar iyo rag  isugu jira oo tuug ahi ay macbiisheen dadka Cusbitaalka ku jira, iyaga oo dhawr qof ka xaday Lacag iyo alaabooyin kale oo muhiim ah oo uu ku jiro Dahab laba todobaad ka hor lagaga xaday haweenay ku jirtay Cusbitaalka, gaar ahaan qaybta Dhalmada Haweenka.
Sidoo kale waxa la sheegay in todobaadkii ugu dambeeyay Nin Tuug ah iyo Gabadh ka mid ah dadka ku jira qaybta dhimirka ee Cusbitaalka lagu qabtay iyaga oo u dhacaya qaybta Caruurta ee Cusbitaalka, kuwaasoo si caadi ah ugu garaacay albaabka Caruurtii halkaasi ku jirtay, isla markaana isku dayay inay mid ka mid ah ka qaataan Bustayaal iyo lacag  yar oo maalintaasi caruurta Hay’adi siisay oo loo qaybiyay.

Dadkan Wargeyska Waaheen  uga waramay falalkan foosha xun ee Cisbitaalka ka dhex dilaacay ayaa sheegay in dadka hawshan ku lug leh ay qaarkood Cusbitaalka u hoydaan, isla markaan wakhti hore ay hawlo caafimaad ugu jireen, iyad oo tuugadoodani fursad ka heshay dayac iyo baylah dhinaca ilaalada Cusbitaalka ah, waxaanay intaasi ku  dareen in xataa waxyaabo kale oo  fool xun cusbitaalka lala soo galo.

Cusbitaalka guud ee Hargeysa oo ka mid ah Hay’ada uu sameeyay Isbedelkii Siyaasadeed ee Dalka ka dhacay sanadka ka hor, waxa ay sheegayaan dadka ku xidhani inay xaaladiisu marayso meeshii ugu xumayd, gaar ahaan adeegyadii Caafimaad iyo waliba Maamulkiisuba.
Waxaana taasi loo aanaynayaa Xukuumadda oo ka gaabisay daba galka Maamulkiisa iyo Dhakhaatiirtii ka hawl geli jirtay oo is dhintay ama qaarkood shaqadii ka fadhiisteen.